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 chapter 6 
 instruments of 
trade p olicy  
 GEOFFREY A. JEHLE 
 I.  Introduction 
 Governments implement a variety of policies targeting international trade—both 
imports and exports—and they do so for a variety of reasons. In this chapter, we exam-
ine the principal instruments of trade policy used by modern governments. Our goal 
will be to understand the impact each one has on the allocation of resources and on the 
distribution of welfare to consumers, producers, and government in the country that 
employs it. 
 II.  Import Tariffs 
 Th e Many Types of Tariff s 
 Ad valorem  and specifi c tariff s 
 A tariff  is a tax on imports. An  ad valorem tariff  is expressed as a per cent of the imported 
good’s value or price: a 10 per cent tax on the price of imported tomatoes is an example 
of an  ad valorem tariff . A specifi c tariff  is expressed as a fi xed amount of money per unit 
of the good: a charge of $20 per 100 pounds of imported tomatoes is an example of a 
specifi c tariff . Of course, each type of tariff  can be directly converted into an equivalent 
tariff  of the other type. For example, if the price of imported tomatoes is $200 per 100 
pounds, the 10 per cent  ad valorem tariff  is equivalent to the $20 specifi c tariff —each 
requires the importer to pay a customs duty of $20 on one 100 pounds of tomatoes. As 
part of the “July 2004 Package” of the Doha Development Agenda, member countries of 
the WTO have now agreed to work toward converting all non- ad valorem tariff s to their 
 ad valorem  equivalents and to henceforth base negotiations on those. In this chapter, we 
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will always speak in terms of  ad valorem tariff s. Of course, because of their ready con-
vertibility, conclusions regarding  ad valorem tariff s will apply to specifi c ones too, as well 
as to combinations of the two. 
 Tariff s can be discriminatory or non-discriminatory by source. Any tariff  that applies 
only to the goods of a particular nation or group of nations is a discriminatory tariff . For 
example, tariff s on Italian shoes, or on Egyptian cotton, would both be discriminatory 
tariff s. By contrast, a non-discriminatory tariff  is one that applies to all goods of a certain 
category, regardless of their country of origin. Tariff s on shoes, and cotton, regardless 
of source, would be non-discriminatory tariff s. Early GATT rules, and current WTO 
rules, generally forbid member countries from explicit discrimination among other 
members’ goods. If a member extends some tariff  preference to imports from another 
member, that same preference must be extended to imports of the same goods from all 
members. Some major exceptions to this so-called “most favored nation” (MFN) rule 
have been allowed, though. Some signifi cant regional trading arrangements—such as 
the European Union—are allowed to off er tariff  preferences to member states that are 
not off ered to WTO members outside the union. Some of the original Commonwealth 
Preferences, giving members of the British Commonwealth special access to the 
British market, have been preserved by the Lomé Convention even aft er Britain’s entry 
into the European Union. In addition, the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) continues to promote special access for goods from many 
developing countries into developed countries’ markets on special, preferential terms, 
and this has been accepted into the Development Agenda of the Doha Round. 
 A protective tariff  is one applied to shield a domestic industry from the competition of 
foreign suppliers. A revenue tariff , by contrast, is one applied purely to raise revenue for 
the government. Many years ago, a great many tariff s were revenue duties: it was com-
paratively easy to identify incoming ships, trains, and other vehicles at border crossings 
and levy the tax. Today, income and other forms of taxation provide by far the largest 
share of government tax revenues in most developed countries, so the majority of tariff s 
in those countries are protective duties. In many less-developed countries, though, tar-
iff s remain an important source of government revenue. 
 Nominal and Eff ective Rates of Protection 
 When domestic production of an import substitute requires the use of imported inputs 
that are themselves subject to tariff s, the nominal rate of tariff  applied to fi nal-good 
imports may diff er quite substantially from the overall extent of protection aff orded 
domestic producers of the import substitute. Th e eff ective rate of protection is an esti-
mate of the overall extent to which domestic value added in production is protected by 
the country’s entire tariff  structure as it aff ects the imported fi nal good and all inter-
mediate goods in the production process. Calculating eff ective rates of protection is 
a tedious business, and it is oft en of necessity based on arguable assumptions about 
the underlying production process. Nonetheless the exercise can be illuminating and 
can provide policy makers with sobering and important information. It is easy to see, 
for example, that while tariff s on a fi nal good tend to advantage domestic producers 
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of the good, tariff s on their imported inputs essentially serve as taxes on those same 
producers. It is therefore quite possible that a haphazard or uncoordinated tariff  struc-
ture—thought to be encouraging domestic producers—may, instead, actually serve to 
 discourage domestic production of that good if the rate of eff ective protection aff orded 
by the entire tariff  structure is negative. Quite apart from the wisdom of implementing 
those tariff s in the fi rst place, such a situation is, at the very least, usually at odds with the 
policymakers’ intentions. 
 Tariff s Today 
 Th e post-war drive for broad trade liberalization, starting with the GATT and continu-
ing through the WTO, has led to signifi cant worldwide reduction in tariff s.  Table 6.1 
reports average rates of tariff , in their  ad valorem equivalent, across broad WTO mem-
ber groupings in 2008. For comparison, earlier fi gures are included in parenthesis. 
Over roughly the past two decades, tariff  rates have declined very broadly—sometimes 
 Table 6.1  Tariff rates by WTO member grouping, 2008 
 Average Percentage 
of lines 
greater than 
15% Simple  Weighted  Std. dev.  Max. rate 
 High-income Members      
 Effective Applied Rate  2.5  1.3  6.2  555  2.4 
 MFN Rate  3.2  2.3  7.5  555  2.7 
 Preferential  0.8  0.8  6.2  500  0.9 
 (1988 Effective Applied Rate)  (4.3)  (3.3) 
 Developing Members      
 Effective Applied Rate  7.2  4.3  20.3  3000  18.8 
 MFN Rate  9.3  6.3  22.7  3000  24.9 
 Preferential  2.2  1.5  7.3  254  6.2 
 (1988 Effective Applied Rate)  (18.9)  (16.4) 
 Least-developed Members      
 Effective Applied Rate  13.1  9.7  11.1  200  54.0 
 MFN Rate  13.3  10.4  9.7  200  48.1 
 Preferential  4.8  2.1  9.7  100  29.2 
 (1989 Effective Applied Rate)  (105.4)  (88.4) 
 Source: UNCTAD TRAINS database at < http://r0.unctad.org/trains_new/index.shtm > 
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signifi cantly. However, while rates of tariff  are generally lower than they were in the past, 
there remains considerable diversity across product lines (so-called tariff  lines), and 
across countries. While developing and least developed WTO members have always 
had higher average rates of tariff , covering a broader range of products, even among 
developed countries some products continue to be subject to extremely high rates of 
protection. Hence, a good distance has yet to be traveled in the drive for worldwide 
trade liberalization. 
 Tariff  Incidence in the Small Country 
 To explore the impact of tariff s more closely, we begin with the case of a small country. 
For our purposes, a country is considered small in the world market for some good, 
regardless of that country’s population or geographic size, if its domestic consumption, 
domestic production, and imports of the good have only negligible eff ects on world 
market conditions, especially the good’s price. 
 Th roughout this chapter, we will assume that the domestic markets in our analysis are 
perfectly competitive, with many small consumers and many competing producers of 
the same homogeneous good. Even when these are not wholly accurate descriptions of 
the relevant market structure, assuming competitive markets is a useful simplifi cation 
that leads us, in many cases, to similar conclusions to those we would reach through 
application of more complex methods needed to analyze imperfectly competitive 
markets. 
 Figure  6. 1 depicts domestic market demand and domestic market supply for some 
good at diff erent market prices. With no access to world markets, the equilibrium mar-
ket price and the quantity of the good produced and consumed in this small country 
would be found at the intersection of market demand and market supply. However, in 
 
S 
Price
 Quantity
D
A B C D 
Pw
Pd = Pw + tPw
 figure 6.1  A tariff ’s impact on resource allocation. 
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a regime of free trade, if buyers and sellers residing in this country have costless access 
to the larger world market on which this good currently trades at world price  P  w  , and if 
(as we will assume) domestic buyers regard the imported item as indistinguishable from 
the domestic good, no consumer would be willing to pay more than  P  w  for a unit of this 
good and, so, no domestic producer could sell above that price. In  Figure  6. 1 , we can see 
from the domestic market demand curve that, at a price of  P  w  , buyers would demand 
a total of D units. At that same price, we can see from the domestic supply curve that 
domestic producers would be willing to produce only A units. Th e diff erence between 
domestic demand and domestic supply at  P  w  —the quantity represented by the line seg-
ment AD—measures the quantity of imports. Notice that any good a country imports is 
necessarily one for which there is  excess demand in the domestic market at the prevail-
ing world market price. 
 How Tariff s Aff ect Resource Allocation 
 If an  ad valorem tariff  rate of  t > 0 (in decimal form) is imposed on imports of this 
good, then under this tariff  policy a unit of the foreign-produced good, valued on the 
world market at  P  w  , would be subject to import taxes of  tP  w  . Initially, buyers in the 
tariff -imposing country would be faced with a choice: buy a unit of the domestic good 
for the prevailing price  P  w  , or buy a unit of the imported good, which importers could 
sell for no less than  P  w  +  tP  w  and still break even. Any sensible buyer would want to buy 
the domestic item at the now-cheaper price. 
 But what eff ect would such actions—taken by large numbers of buyers simultane-
ously—have on market conditions and the allocation of resources in the tariff -imposing 
country? 
 Before the tariff  was imposed, home-country buyers, in all, were prepared to buy 
more units of the good at  P  w  than home-country producers were prepared to sell at that 
price, the diff erence being made up by imports. But now, as home-country buyers turn 
away from the costlier import and turn toward the domestic good, they will soon fi nd 
there is not enough to satisfy all buyers at the prevailing price. Th is excess demand from 
domestic buyers will then cause the price of the domestic good,  P  d  , to rise above  P  w  , as 
buyers bid against each other for the available quantity. Th is rise in the domestic price, 
set off  by imposition of the tariff , will then, itself, set in motion powerful market forces 
aff ecting both domestic producers and consumers. 
 As the price they must pay for the domestic good begins to rise, consumers will 
tend to reduce their purchases, economizing on this increasingly expensive item. Th is 
is called the consumption eff ect of the tariff . At the same time, the rising price of the 
domestic good makes it now more profi table for domestic producers to increase pro-
duction in existing plants, to bring new plants into production, and perhaps even for 
new fi rms to enter the market. Th e extent to which the tariff  increases domestic pro-
duction of the import substitute is called the protective eff ect of the tariff . In  Figure  6. 1 , 
imposition of this tariff  should see the domestic price of the good,  P  d  , begin to rise above 
 P  w  . As it does, domestic consumers move up the market demand curve, and the total 
number of units they demand will begin to decline left ward from D; at the same time, 
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however, domestic producers move up the market supply curve and domestic produc-
tion will increase rightward from A. 
 Both the decrease in domestic consumption and the increase in domestic produc-
tion caused by the rise in  P  d  work to reduce excess demand for the domestic good and 
so, over time, tend to slow the rise in its price. When will that process stop entirely? 
A moment’s thought will convince you that as long as the price of the domestic good, 
 P  d  , is less than the price of the imported item, inclusive of tariff ,  P  w  +  tP  w  , domestic con-
sumers will continue to turn to domestic sources and, as long as these remain in excess 
demand in the domestic market,  P d  will continue to rise. If the tariff  were suffi  ciently 
high that  P  w  + tP  w  exceeded the price at which domestic demand and supply intersect 
in  Figure  6. 1 , then  P  d  would rise to the level of that point of intersection and the total 
quantity demanded by domestic buyers would be willingly supplied by domestic pro-
ducers at that price. Th ere would then no longer be pressure on domestic price to rise 
as all those who wish to buy the good at that price would fi nd a willing domestic sup-
plier. In this scenario, imports would have been completely choked off . A tariff  with this 
eff ect is called a prohibitive tariff . If, however, the rate of tariff  were not prohibitive, and 
P w  +  tP w  were, say, as indicated on the vertical axis in  Figure  6. 1 , then  P d  would rise only 
to that level and no further. Why no further? Because if  P  d  were to rise above  P  w  + tP  w  , 
domestic buyers would once again fi nd imports cheaper than the domestic good and so 
switch their purchases back to the imported item. Foreign exporters would be willing 
to sell at that price, too, since they collect  P w  +  tP w  per unit from home country buyers, 
pay the home country government t P  w  in tariff  duties, and receive, net, the world price 
per unit,  P  w  . We conclude that, for all but prohibitive tariff s, the domestic price of the 
protected good must rise by the full extent of the tariff , so that in the post-tariff  market 
equilibrium,
 P tPd wP w= +  . (6.1) 
 Th is is illustrated in  Figure   6. 1 . 
 Stepping back to compare the pre-tariff  equilibrium with the full post-tariff  equilib-
rium, what eff ects has the decision to implement this non-prohibitive tariff  had on the 
allocation of resources in the tariff -imposing country? Some are seen in  Figure  6. 1 , and 
we’ve noted them already: as the price of the domestic good rises, increased domestic 
production from A to B is encouraged, and decreased domestic consumption from D 
to C results. Th e quantity of imports falls, too, from AD before the tariff  to BC aft er. In 
addition, the government now collects tariff  revenue that it did not have before. Th is is 
called the revenue eff ect of the tariff  .
 But some of the eff ects of this tariff  are unseen. For example, as fi rms increase output 
from A to B, additional labor is hired and employment in the protected industry will 
rise; additional capital, raw materials, and other domestic resources will be drawn into 
the protected industry too. Th ese resources will have to come from somewhere: to the 
extent that they are induced away from other productive uses elsewhere in the economy, 
we can expect that output and employment in those other industries will decline. We 
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will not pursue the full implications of these unseen eff ects right now: but it is wise to 
keep an awareness of them in the back of the mind. 
 How Tariff s Aff ect Peoples’ Welfare 
 Tariff s cause prices to change, and people are aff ected as a result. But just how a per-
son is aff ected depends importantly on who they are. Consumers of the import and the 
domestic good are generally made worse off  by tariff s: they must pay higher prices for 
the goods they purchase—whether that is the imported item or the domestically pro-
duced one. Both will rise in price with the tariff . On the other hand, domestic producers 
of the good will generally be better off : higher prices for their product, and higher levels 
of employment and production, usually translate into higher earnings and profi t for the 
fi rms’ owners. Th e government, too, gains some advantage from the tariff : as long as the 
tariff  does not choke off  all imports, the government will have a new source of revenue—
the tariff  (tax) revenue on the remaining volume of imports. 
 Th at tariff s can redistribute welfare in this manner—away from consumers and 
toward domestic producers and the government—is an important consequence of tar-
iff s and, indeed, may oft en be the motivating reason a government will decide to impose 
them. Perhaps the imported good is considered by government to be a frivolous luxury 
item, only consumed by the idle rich. Th en some justifi cation may be felt in imposing 
the tariff  precisely because it redistributes welfare away from those consumers toward 
others. Perhaps, instead, domestic producers of the good are a favored group: politi-
cal backers of the regime in power, for example, or perhaps merely just a sympathetic 
group—poor village women producing simple manufactured or agricultural goods, for 
example. In such cases, the motivation to impose the tariff  may simply be an affi  rmative 
desire to help the favored group, with no particular desire to discourage anyone’s con-
sumption or harm anyone else. Nonetheless, the tariff  will help some and it will harm 
others—there will be winners  and losers. Th is simple fact should give the policymaker 
pause to consider the distributional eff ects of the tariff  in their entirety. 
 What’s Wrong with Tariff s 
 Granting that there will be winners and losers when a tariff  is imposed, what can we say 
about its welfare eff ects on the tariff -imposing country “as a whole?” To answer this, 
we need some way to measure the impact of tariff s on those that are aff ected, and we 
need some agreement on how the diff erent costs borne by some and benefi ts enjoyed 
by others will be added up, or aggregated, into an overall assessment of the impact on 
society as a whole. Economists commonly use consumer surplus to measure the welfare 
eff ects on consumers, and producer surplus to measure the eff ects on domestic produc-
ers. Consumer and producer surplus measures, and their relation to social welfare, are 
described in the Annex to this chapter. In the discussion to follow, it is assumed the 
reader is familiar with that material. 
 In  Figure  6. 2 , which reproduces the elements of  Figure  6. 1 , the distributional eff ects 
of the tariff  can be clearly seen. Th e tariff , causing domestic price of the good to rise 
from  P  w  to  P  w  +  tP  w  , causes consumer welfare, measured by consumer surplus, to fall 
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by an amount equal to sum of areas  a + b + c + d . Th at same price rise, however, causes 
the welfare of domestic producers, measured by producer surplus, to rise by an amount 
equal to area  a . In addition, the government now collects tariff  revenue it did not have 
before, and if we presume that each such dollar is used by the government to benefi t 
 someone in society by a dollar, we must also reckon that revenue on the “plus” side of 
the social ledger. In  Figure  6. 2 , the area marked  c measures the full extent of the tariff  
revenue collected by the government:  tP  w  (the height of box  c ) is collected on each of BC 
units imported (the width of the box  c ), giving total tariff  revenue equal to the product, 
 tP  w  (AB). 
 If we are content to treat a dollar’s gain, or loss, to any one person in society as having 
the same social importance as a dollar’s gain or loss to anyone else—a strictly utilitarian 
criterion of social welfare—then how do the winners’ gains and losers’ losses all add up? 
It is easy to see in  F igure  6. 2 that if consumers lose  a+b+c+d , while producers gain  a and 
the government gains revenue of  c , there is still a net loss to society equal to the sum of 
areas  b+d . Th is is called the dead-weight loss due to the tariff —it is welfare that someone 
in society  could be enjoying if it weren’t for the tariff —and it measures the magnitude of 
the net social loss from the tariff  that will be borne, period aft er period, while the tariff  
is in place. 
 How, intuitively, can we understand the sources of this net social loss? First, notice 
that there are two distinct components to it: area  d and area  b . Let’s focus on area  d fi rst. 
Recall that one eff ect of the tariff  is to cause consumers to reduce their purchases from 
D to C. Th e total value of those units to consumers—their total willingness to pay for 
them—is equal to the area under the demand curve, or  d + f . Before the tariff , those CD 
units of domestic consumption were imported from the foreigner at  P  w  per unit, or for 
a total outlay of only  f . Area  d , then, measures the net gain consumers were able to enjoy 
when, before the tariff , they consumed something worth  d + f to them while paying 
only  f to have it. With the tariff , that consumption of CD is no more and, so, neither is 
 
S 
Price
 Quantity
D
A B C D 
Pw
Pd = Pw + tPw
a b c d 
e f 
 figure 6.2  A tariff ’s impact on welfare. 
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the net benefi t someone in society enjoyed from it. Now focus on area  b . Recall that the 
other eff ect of the tariff  was to encourage increased production of the domestic good 
by an additional AB units. Before the tariff , those AB units of domestic consumption 
were, instead, imported from the foreigner for  P  w  per unit, or a total outlay of domestic 
resources equal to area  e . Producing those AB units domestically requires the use of 
domestic resources—land, labor, capital, and other resources—and those have a dollar 
value equal to the whole of the area under the supply curve, or  b+e . Area  b , then, meas-
ures the amount of  additional domestic resources now devoted to that bit of domes-
tic consumption over and above what had to be expended before the tariff . Economists 
call area  d the consumption-side ineffi  ciency introduced by the tariff  and area  b the 
production-side ineffi  ciency. 
 We’ve argued that area  b+d must be regarded as a net social loss, “if we are content 
to treat a dollar’s gain, or loss, to any one person in society as having the same social 
importance as a dollar’s gain or loss to anyone else.” But what if the policymaker has very 
good reasons not to hold this view? Suppose, for example, there is a broad social consen-
sus that domestic producers, as a historically disadvantaged group in this society, merit 
extra weight in the social calculation; that a dollar’s gain in welfare to that group should 
be given greater importance than a dollar’s loss in welfare to consumers of this good in 
the overall social evaluation. Policymakers oft en have perfectly valid distribution pref-
erences of this sort, and welfare redistribution is a very common objective of govern-
ment policy. Since tariff s redistribute welfare, why not use them to help achieve those 
distributional goals whenever possible? Th e answer is simple: tariff s are an ineffi  cient 
means of redistributing welfare. Because the dollar value of the welfare loss to consum-
ers is greater than the dollar value of the welfare gain to producers and the government 
by the amount  b + d , consumers end up paying that much more than they should have 
to in order for the government to achieve the goal of transferring welfare in the amount 
 a + c . If, instead of implementing a tariff , government were to simply impose a lump-sum 
tax on consumers equal in total dollar amount to area  a + c , then transfer that amount to 
producers and anyone else it favored, the recipients would be just as well off  as they were 
going to be under the tariff  policy, but consumers—still able to consume the imported 
good at  P  w  —would suff er a welfare loss of only  a+c and so be better off  than they would 
have been under the tariff  policy by  b + d . Because tariff s distort prices faced by consum-
ers and producers they introduce consumption-side and production-side ineffi  ciencies, 
making the cost of achieving the distributional objective greater than it needs to be. For 
more discussion of the dead-weight loss and its relation to social welfare, see the Annex 
to this chapter. 
 Tariff  Incidence in the Large Country 
 Th e analysis of tariff s in the case of a large country is similar to that of a small 
country, but there are also important diff erences. Regardless of its geographic size, 
a country is considered a large country in the world market for some good if its 
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domestic consumption, domestic production, and imports of it can have noticeable 
eff ects on world market conditions, especially market price. 
 Th e Terms of Trade Eff ect 
 As we’ve seen, tariff s reduce domestic consumption and encourage domestic produc-
tion, thereby reducing the volume of a country’s imports. When those imports are an 
important component of total world demand for the good, that drop in imports will shift  
the world demand curve for the good and cause its equilibrium world price to fall. Th is 
terms of trade eff ect can mitigate the adverse eff ects of the tariff  on the tariff -imposing 
country, essentially by shift ing a portion of the burden onto its trading partners. 
 To see this more clearly, consider  Figure  6. 3 , which depicts domestic market demand 
and supply for a large-country importer of some good. Under free trade, the initial 
world price is again  P  w  , domestic consumption is at D, domestic production at A, with 
imports of AD. If an  ad valorem tariff  of  t > 0 were imposed, and if the fall in this coun-
try’s imports were to have no eff ect on world market price, let us suppose that the domes-
tic price of the good would rise to  P w + tP w  . However, if the decrease in import demand 
from the tariff -imposing country causes world market price for the good to fall to, say, 
w
1P , then the domestic price of the good in the tariff -imposing country will only rise to 
Pw1  +  tP
w
1  before equilibrium is restored with domestic consumption of C, domestic pro-
duction of B, and imports of BC. As we’ve seen before, this tariff  discourages domestic con-
sumption, encourages domestic production, and reduces the country’s volume of imports. 
 Th e distributive eff ects of this tariff  are similar to those we’ve seen in the small coun-
try: the increase in domestic price caused by the tariff  redistributes welfare from con-
sumers to producers and the government. Here, consumer welfare is again reduced by 
 a + b + c  1  + d , producer welfare again increases by  a , and government again earns new 
revenue of  c  1  + c  2  . Th e tariff  again introduces a consumption-side ineffi  ciency of  d and 
 
S 
Price
 Quantity
D
A B C D 
P w
Pw+ tPw
a b c1 d 
c2
P1
w+ tP1w
P1w
 figure 6.3  Tariff  incidence in a large country. 
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a production-side ineffi  ciency of  b , but this time there is no net loss to society. In fact, 
social welfare  increases overall as a result of this tariff ! How can that be? Notice that, this 
time, part of the tariff  revenue the government collects—that part of total tariff  revenue, 
labeled  c  2  , that lies below the level of the original price  P  w  —is, in eff ect, no new burden for 
domestic consumers, who only see the price they pay rise from  P w  to Pw1  +  tP
w
1  . Instead, 
it is a new type of burden being imposed on the country’s trading partners. Foreign 
producers, who previously received  P  w  per unit on those BC units now receive only Pw1
. Domestic consumers may pay a total tariff  bill equal to the whole of areas  c  1  + c  2  , but only 
the portion above  P w  is a new net burden on them: the portion below the level of  P w  can 
be regarded as a transfer of welfare from foreign producers, to domestic consumers, and 
then from domestic consumers to the government. In  Figure  6. 3 , the size of that transfer 
from the country’s trading partners more than off sets the effi  ciency losses  b + d , resulting 
in a net welfare  gain for the tariff -imposing country. 
 Th e Optimal Tariff  
 One should not regard the case we’ve just described as rare or unusual. Quite oft en, 
when a country’s import volumes have some impact on the world price, it should be 
able to craft  some tariff  that is welfare improving. Of course, policymakers could get it 
wrong—so this does not mean that just  any rate of tariff  will raise welfare in the large 
country. But there will oft en be at least one rate for which the tariff  revenue extracted 
from the country’s trading partners more than compensates for the production-side and 
consumption-side ineffi  ciencies it causes. Since there may be more than one such rate, 
the one which maximizes the country’s net gain is called the optimal tariff  . 
 By distorting market prices at home and abroad, one country’s optimal tariff  always 
introduces consumption-side and production-side ineffi  ciencies into the world econ-
omy. And while we’ve seen that those it causes in the tariff -imposing country itself are 
more than outweighed by that country’s tariff  revenue gains, those tariff  revenue gains 
are at the expense of producers somewhere else. Th e world as a whole must therefore 
lose when any country imposes an optimal tariff . 
 But should any one country’s policymakers be more concerned about world welfare 
than they are about their own national welfare? If an optimal tariff  can raise your coun-
try’s welfare, shouldn’t you impose one? Doesn’t the imperative of advancing the nation’s 
interest compel it? 
 Perhaps, but it would be wise to think carefully before doing so. Because when the 
tariff -imposing country gains only at the expense of its trading partners, those trading 
partners may not just sit idly by. In fact, there may be good reasons for them to retaliate 
with tariff s of their own. 
 Retaliation 
 When two or more countries’ welfare are interdependent—when the actions of any one 
of them can aff ect the others, as well as themselves—all the elements of a strategic game 
are present. In such situations, rational “players” must think carefully about how others 
are likely to respond to actions they take, and how that, in turn, can aff ect them. 
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 Figure  6. 4 is the payoff  matrix for a typical “tariff  game” between two large countries. 
Each country may either elect a regime of free trade, with no tariff s, or it may implement 
its optimal tariff . We’ve seen that if one country implements an optimal tariff  while its 
trading partner acquiesces and continues with a policy of free trade, the tariff -imposing 
country’s welfare will rise and that of its trading partner will fall. It is easy to imagine that 
if, instead, the trading partner were to retaliate and impose an optimal tariff  of its own, 
that country could recoup some of its losses, albeit at the expense of the other country. 
Th e entries in the payoff  matrix refl ect this thinking. Th e fi rst number in each cell is 
some index of national welfare in Country 1, the row player, and the second some index 
of national welfare in Country 2, the column player. 
 Let’s look carefully at the strategic situation facing each of these countries as they 
contemplate what their trade policy should be. If Country 1 believes Country 2 will 
continue to pursue free trade even if Country 1 imposes an optimal tariff , Country 1 
can raise its welfare from 100 to 120. If, instead, Country 1 believes that Country 2 will 
impose its optimal tariff , Country 1 would suff er welfare of only 80 if it adhered to free 
trade. But it could recoup some of its loss, and have welfare of 90, if, instead, it retaliated 
with an optimal tariff  of its own. Notice that no matter what Country 1 thinks Country 
2 will do, its own best course of action is always the same: it should impose an optimal 
tariff ! Of course, the same is true of Country 2: no matter what it thinks Country 1 will 
do, its own best course of action is always to impose an optimal tariff  too. Game theorists 
would say imposing an optimal tariff  is a strictly dominant strategy for each of these 
countries because no matter what the other player does, that strategy is always the play-
er’s very best course of action. Rational players, when they have them, can be expected 
to use their strictly dominant strategies, so the outcome of this game seems easy to pre-
dict: each country will impose an optimal tariff  and each will receive welfare of 90. 
 But notice something interesting about this outcome: both countries are worse off  
than they would be if they had both resisted the temptation and stayed with a policy of 
free trade: each would have then had welfare of 100, instead of only 90. Recognizing this, 
rational players should then, instead, elect free trade, right? Th ey would both be better 
off  if they did. But if either one in fact elects free trade, the other can do even better by 
imposing an optimal tariff , getting welfare of 120! If either thinks its rival might just do 
such a thing, it is better off  protecting itself with its own optimal tariff , getting welfare 
of 90, rather than suff ering 80. But if they both think and act this way, the outcome is, 
again, that each imposes an optimal tariff  on the other and both are again worse off  than 
they would be if they had both elected free trade! Th is sorry state of aff airs is called a 
 
Country 2
Free trade Optimal tariff
Country 1 Free trade 100, 100 80, 120
Optimal tariff 120, 80 90, 90
 figure 6.4  Tariff s and retaliation. 
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Prisoner’s Dilemma: while there may be mutual gains to be had by cooperating to sup-
port a regime of free trade, the logic of national interest makes those gains seemingly 
impossible to attain. 
 Diffi  cult, perhaps, but not impossible. One way around this Prisoners Dilemma would 
be to change the payoff s countries see in the choice between free trade and protection. 
Indeed, one can regard much of the post-war eff ort to create institutions such as the 
GATT and WTO, and to write the rules for membership in them, as an eff ort to do just 
that. Negotiations that result in mutually agreed upon rules and sanction regimes are 
oft en able to modify the structure of incentives from those so starkly apparent here, by 
increasing the gains from cooperation and reducing the gains from unilateral action. In 
so doing, they hope to align the incentives of individual member countries to fi nd it more 
in their national interest to play their part in the cooperative outcome with benefi ts for all. 
 III.  Import Quotas 
 A quota is a quantitative restriction on trade. Under an import quota, the govern-
ment sets an upper limit on the quantity of some good that may be imported in a given 
period—say, a limit of 40 tons of wheat per year. With a quota, no tax is collected on 
imports directly, as with a tariff . However, the quota will have very similar eff ects as a 
tariff  does on resource allocation and the distribution of welfare. But there are a few key 
diff erences, too. 
 How Quotas Aff ect Resource Allocation and Welfare 
 Th e domestic market for an imported good is depicted in  Figure  6. 5 . Under free trade, 
imports are available on the world market at  P  w  and this small country imports the 
quantity AD. Now suppose the government implements a quota on imports, mandating 
that no more than BC < AD units be admitted. Because domestic consumers demand D 
units at the free trade price  P  w  , while domestic producers provide only A at that price, 
once imports are restricted to something less than AD, there will be excess domestic 
demand for the good at the world price  P  w  . Th e domestic price will therefore begin to 
rise above  P  w  as frustrated buyers begin trying to outbid one another for the available 
quantity. As the domestic price begins to rise, domestic producers will increase produc-
tion and domestic consumers will reduce their consumption. Price will continue to rise 
until the total quantity demanded by consumers at the prevailing price is matched by the 
quantity domestic producers are willing to supply at that price, plus imports of no more 
than BC, as is the case at  P  d  . 
 Th rough these indirect eff ects on domestic price, a quota, like a tariff , encour-
ages increased production of the import substitute, and draws additional resources of 
land, labor, and capital into the protected sector, as domestic producers respond to the 
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good’s rising price. Here, the protective eff ect of the quota is AB. Th ere is a consump-
tion eff ect, too, as consumers also respond to the good’s rising price, reducing their total 
purchases by CD. 
 It is easy to see in  Figure  6. 5 that the quota of BC units ultimately has exactly the same 
eff ects on domestic production, domestic consumption, and the allocation of resources 
to the protected sector as would an appropriate  ad valorem tariff . Specifi cally, a tariff  
rate of ( P  d  –  P  w  )/  P  w  would raise domestic price to  P  w  + (( P  d  –  P  w  )/  P  w  ) P  w   =  P  d  , giving 
precisely the same ultimate eff ects on production and consumption. In this sense, there 
is said to be tariff  and quota equivalence in the ultimate eff ects each of them has on the 
allocation of resources. 
 Tariff  and Quota Equivalence? 
 Th e rise in price following imposition of the quota redistributes welfare, too, very much 
like a tariff . But there are some important diff erences. 
 As price rises from  P  w  to  P  d  , consumer surplus falls by  a + b + c + d , while producer 
surplus rises by  a . Putting aside for the moment what we should make of area  c , there 
will again be net national welfare losses of  b and  d , as there were with the tariff , because 
quotas introduce the same sort of production-side and consumption-side ineffi  ciencies 
as tariff s do. 
 Under a tariff , that part of the loss that is consumer surplus measured by area  c was 
compensated for by an equal increase in tariff  revenue collected by government. With a 
quota, the government does not collect any tax revenue of this sort. Instead, it allocates 
rights to import—import licenses—and how those rights are allocated directly aff ects 
the distribution of welfare. 
 
S 
Price
Quantity
D
A B C D 
Pw
Pd
a b c d 
 figure 6.5  A quota’s impact on resource allocation and welfare. 
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 Suppose, for example, that the government simply awards a license to import one 
unit of this good to some importer. Th at individual could purchase one unit of the 
good abroad at the world price  P  w  , import it into the country and sell it at the prevailing 
domestic price  P  d  , earning a profi t—or, more precisely—an economic rent—equal to 
 P  d  −  P  w  . If licenses for a total of BC units are simply given to importers—say in propor-
tion to the quantities each imported before the quota was imposed—then total rents 
earned by all importers so favored would be equal in amount to area  c . In this scenario, 
the quota redistributes welfare from consumers to domestic producers and to those 
lucky enough to secure import licenses at no cost. 
 But why should government simply give away such a valuable item? If, instead, it 
were to auction off  those import licenses, importers, and others, would have an incen-
tive to bid for them. Since each unit of the good purchased abroad and then sold on the 
domestic market under the quota regime would earn economic rent of  P  d  −  P  w  , bidders 
would bid up to precisely that amount in order to obtain the right to import a unit. If the 
rights to BC units were auctioned for their full value to bidders, the government could 
earn revenue from the sale of the full set of licenses equal in amount to the whole of 
area  a ! Under this method of allocating import licenses, the distributional, as well as the 
allocative, eff ects of the quota are fully equivalent to those of an appropriate  ad valorem 
tariff : the quota redistributes welfare from consumers to domestic producers and the 
government, with a net reduction in national welfare overall due to the production-side 
and consumption-side ineffi  ciencies caused by the quota. 
 Th ere are others ways in which tariff s and quotas are not entirely “equivalent.” For 
one, the protective eff ect of a non-prohibitive  ad valorem tariff  remains unchanged as 
changing economic conditions in the tariff -imposing country aff ect domestic demand 
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tPw
t1P
w
 figure 6.6  Quota incidence with shift ing supply. 
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and/or supply of the protected good—and this is not so with quotas. Th e  de facto rate 
of protection under a quota will usually change whenever domestic demand and/or 
domestic supply of the good change.  Figure  6. 6 illustrates the point. Th ere, a given quota 
restriction in the amount BC has a  de facto rate of protection equal to an  ad valorem tar-
iff  of  t when domestic market supply is  S 1  . If supply shift s to  S 2  —due, say, to an increase 
in input prices, bad weather or some other supply-side shock—the domestic price of the 
protected good will rise further—this time to Pd1 —giving a  de facto rate of protection 
equal to that of a larger  ad valorem tariff ,  t  1   > t . Finally, though we will not explore the 
issue in detail here, we should also note that tariff s and quotas may have quite diff er-
ent eff ects when the domestic market is not perfectly competitive. For example, when a 
domestic monopoly produces the import substitute, a tariff  forces that fi rm to act much 
like a competitive fi rm in the larger world market, but when a quota is used, the domes-
tic monopoly remains free to exercise its monopoly power over whatever is left  to it of 
the domestic market aft er the quota. 
 IV.  Exports 
 Until now we’ve focused on policies directed at imports. Policymakers can, and do, 
implement policies that aff ect the country’s exports as well. In the United States, Article 
1, Section 9 of the Constitution contains an explicit prohibition against export duties 
of any kind, but many other countries employ them. Russia taxes its petroleum exports 
and Indonesia taxes its palm oil exports. Export subsidies, particularly agricultural 
export subsidies, have been contentious issues in trade relations between the US and EU, 
and between developed and developing countries more broadly. Th e analysis of export 
taxes and export subsidies, formally very similar to that of tariff s, is oft en a bit less easily 
grasped right at fi rst, so we will proceed carefully. Like tariff s, export taxes and export 
subsidies can be  ad valorem , specifi c or both. Each will have an  ad valorem equivalent, 
however, so we’ll treat all cases with a close look at the impact of  ad valorem export taxes 
and  ad valorem export subsidies alone. 
 Export Taxes 
 Figure  6. 7 depicts domestic demand and supply in the market for some exportable 
good in a small country. In the absence of any opportunity to trade with others, the 
domestic market clearing price would be at the intersection of market demand and 
supply, well below the world price,  P  w  . Under free trade, this country would therefore 
export the good. At the world price  P  w  , domestic producers want to sell D units while 
at that same price domestic consumers only want to purchase A. Domestic producers 
will fi nd willing buyers abroad, however, and in the free trade equilibrium exports total 
AD units. 
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 Following imposition of an  ad valorem export tariff  (tax) of  t  > 0, domestic produc-
ers of the exportable good are faced with a choice: they can ship the good abroad and 
pay a tax on it, or they can sell it in the domestic market tax-free. At fi rst, the choice 
is simple: if the good is selling at the same price in the domestic market and in the 
export market, net receipts would be lower for sales abroad by the amount of the 
tax, so fi rms will tend to ship fewer units abroad and shift  their sales to the domes-
tic market. As many fi rms act in this way, the quantity of output redirected toward 
the domestic market will cause the domestic price of the good to  fall . Th at this must 
happen is clear, once we recall that the good was originally in excess supply domesti-
cally: at the world price  P  w  , domestic buyers were unwilling to buy all that domes-
tic producers wanted to sell at that price. Aft er imposition of the export tax, then, 
increased domestic sales by fi rms seeking to avoid the tax on their exports must force 
down the domestic price of the good. But just how far will the domestic price,  P  d  , fall? 
If it were to fall far enough, it would at some point become profi table for producers 
to go ahead and pay the tax on exports if they can earn the higher world price,  P  w  , on 
those sales. Specifi cally, if  P d  >  P w   –  tP d  the fi rm earns more on a unit sold at home 
than it would on a unit taxed upon export at its domestic value,  P  d  , and sold abroad 
at the world price  P  w  . Hence, the fi rm would sell that additional unit at home, putting 
greater downward pressure on  P  d  . By contrast, if  P  d  <  P  w  – tP  d  , the fi rm earns more 
by redirecting that unit abroad, earning more, post-tax, than it would from domes-
tic sales, putting upward pressure on  P  d  . We may conclude, therefore, that pressure 
for the domestic price to change will cease only when neither such situation is pre-
sent: that is, only when  P  d   =  P  w  – tP  d  . Th is can be rearranged and expressed, instead, 
as follows:
P t Pd dP w  (6.2) 
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figure 6.7  Incidence of an export tariff . 
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 Equation (6.2) tells us that the export tax must cause the domestic price of the good 
to fall by the full extent of that  ad valorem tax. Th at is the situation depicted in 
 Figure   6. 7 . 
 It is easy now to see the impact the export tax has on resource allocation in the export-
ing country. As the domestic price falls following imposition of the tax, domestic con-
sumers increase consumption from A to B units. At the same time, domestic producers 
reduce production from D to C, releasing resources of labor, land, and capital. In the 
post-tax equilibrium, the country’s exports have declined from AD to BC. Th e govern-
ment collects tax revenue from the export tariff  of  tP  d  (BC), an amount equal to the area 
marked  d . 
 Th e distributional eff ects of the export tax are easily seen in  Figure  6. 7 , too. With 
reduced production at lower prices, domestic producers of the exportable lose producer 
surplus of  a + b + c + d + e . With greater consumption at a lower price, consumers gain 
consumer surplus of  a+b . As we’ve noted, the government gains new revenue of  d . Th e 
export tariff , then, redistributes welfare from domestic producers to domestic consum-
ers and the government. But notice that producers’ losses are not fully off set by these 
countervailing social gains: there is a net social loss of  c + e . We may understand the net 
national welfare loss as arising from two sources: the redirection of fi rms’ sales from 
exports toward the domestic market, and the reduction in total production caused by 
the tax. 
 We’ve seen that the price decrease causes domestic consumption to rise by AB units. 
Originally, domestic fi rms were able to sell those units to foreign buyers for  b + c in rev-
enue more than they now fetch from domestic buyers. All of that revenue loss cannot be 
reckoned a social loss, however, because domestic consumers now have AB units more 
consumption, on which they enjoy new consumer surplus of  b . Only  c , then, can be 
regarded as a net social loss from the redirection of sales away from exports and toward 
the domestic market. 
 We’ve also seen that the price decrease causes domestic production to fall by CD 
units overall. Under free trade, fi rms earned gross revenue on those units equal to 
the entire area of the rectangle with base CD and height  P  w  . Th e value of society’s 
resources devoted to that amount of production—the land labor and capital used 
by exporting fi rms—totaled an amount equal to the area beneath the market supply 
curve above CD. With the export tax, the fi rms’ lost revenue on those units exceeds 
the value of the resources that were used to produce them by an amount equal to area 
 e , and so that must be reckoned a net loss to society from the overall reduction in 
output. 
 Export Subsidies 
 Everyone knows that if you tax something, you’ll get less of it; and if you subsidize it 
you’ll get more of it. Th e same is true of exports. But exports are not the only thing 
aff ected when government decides to subsidize them. 
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 Figure  6. 8 depicts the domestic market for an exportable good. With free trade at a 
world price of  P  w  , domestic production is at C, domestic consumption at B and exports 
are BC. 
 If an  ad valorem subsidy of  s  > 0 is granted to exports, domestic producers are faced 
with a choice: they can ship the good abroad and receive a subsidy on it, or they can 
sell in the domestic market at the prevailing market price and forego the subsidy. Once 
again, the choice is simple at fi rst: if the good is selling at the same price in the domes-
tic market and in the export market, net receipts would be higher for sales abroad by 
the amount of the subsidy, so fi rms will tend to ship more units abroad and shift  sales 
away from the domestic market. As output is redirected toward the export market, the 
domestic price of the good must begin to  rise as home-country buyers who want the 
good must be willing to pay what sellers can earn, instead, by exporting: if  P d  <  P w + sP w  , 
no fi rm will sell to a domestic buyer so, in the end, equilibrium in the domestic market 
will only be restored when
P sPd wP w= +  (6.3) 
 Equation (6.3) tells us that an export subsidy must cause the domestic price of the good 
to rise by the full extent of that  ad valorem subsidy. Th at is the situation depicted in 
 Figure   6. 8 . 
 As the domestic price of the exportable rises following imposition of the subsidy, 
domestic consumers reduce consumption from B to A units, while domestic produc-
ers increase production from C to D, drawing more domestic resources of labor, land, 
and capital into the production of the exportable good. In the post-subsidy equilibrium, 
exports will rise from BC to AD and the government must make subsidy payments of 
sP  w  (AD), an amount equal to the sum of areas  b + c + d + e + f . 
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figure 6.8  Incidence of an export subsidy. 
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 Th e distributional eff ects of an export subsidy are exactly opposite to those of the 
export tax. With increased production at a higher price, domestic producers of the 
exportable gain producer surplus of  a + b + c + d + e . With lower consumption at a 
higher price, consumers lose consumer surplus of  a+b . To support this policy, the gov-
ernment must commit revenue equal to  b + c + d + e + f to pay fi rms the subsidy. Th e 
export subsidy, then, redistributes welfare away from domestic consumers and the gov-
ernment toward domestic producers of the exportable good. But notice that the losses to 
consumers and the government are greater than the gains to domestic producers: there 
is, this time, a net social loss equal to  b + f . Once again, that net social loss arises from 
two sources:  the fi rms’ sales redirected away from the domestic market and toward 
exports, and the increase in total production encouraged by the subsidy. 
 We’ve seen that the price increase causes domestic consumption to decline by AB 
units. Originally, consumers were able to buy those from domestic producers at  P  w  and 
enjoy a consumer surplus of  b on them. Th at is lost with imposition of the export sub-
sidy and, instead, those AB units are now exported, giving a net social welfare loss equal 
to  b on those units. 
 Th at same price increase induces fi rms to increase total production for export by CD 
units, on which the government pays a subsidy of  e + f to domestic fi rms. Only area  e 
of that, though, is received as new producer surplus by the fi rms: the remainder, area  f , 
therefore represents a net loss to society. 
 V.  The Lerner Symmetry Theorem 
 To this point, we have tended to focus on the impact of policy in one market. Economists 
call that a  partial equilibrium perspective. But economies are complex networks of inter-
connected and interdependent markets. It is rarely the case that some impact felt in one 
market will fail to have repercussions in others. A  general equilibrium , or economy-wide, 
perspective would consider  all the ramifi cations in all directly and indirectly aff ected 
markets whenever a policy is implemented. 
 As it turns out, a full general equilibrium analysis of the policies we’ve considered so 
far would not, in the end, cause us to change the basic conclusions of our partial equi-
librium analysis. We can be grateful for this because forging that general equilibrium 
analysis would require a heavy investment in additional analytical machinery with few 
new insights for the eff ort. But there is one important exception. 
 An Economy-Wide Perspective 
 No economy has unlimited resources. In fact, it is precisely  because a country’s 
resources are limited, while needs and wants are not, that individuals, fi rms, and gov-
ernments must make choices about how to use the country’s resources. A  produc-
tion possibility frontier (PPF), like that depicted in  Figure  6. 9 , illustrates the type of 
06_Zanini_Ch06.indd   164 6/13/2013   1:13:28 PM
instruments of trade policy   165
trade-off  that must be made when resources are limited. On the horizontal axis, dif-
ferent quantities of exportable goods the country can produce are given. On the ver-
tical axis are diff erent amounts of importables it could also produce at home. Points 
like A and B that lie along the frontier indicate the greatest quantity of importables 
the economy can produce if it is also going to produce the corresponding amount of 
exportables, given available technology and the economy’s limited resources of labor, 
land, and capital. 
 Th e PPF in  Figure  6. 9 illustrates an important fact of economic life, and a basic conse-
quence of scarcity: if a country is going to produce more of one thing it must necessarily 
produce less of something else. Imagine a movement along this country’s PPF from A to 
B. If production of importables rises from  I  A  to  I  B  , some of society’s resources will have 
to be directed away from producing exportables, causing the production of those to fall 
from  E  A   to  E  B  . 
 Now with a moment’s refl ection, you will recall that import tariff s cause domestic 
production of importables to rise. In the world of  Figure  6. 9 , such a policy must there-
fore also cause domestic production of exportables to decline! But then another thought 
occurs: export taxes cause domestic production of exportables to decline. In the world 
of  Figure  6. 9 , the resources thereby released must eventually cause the production of 
importables to rise!
 But the “symmetry” actually goes much deeper than this. 
Rational consumers and producers throughout the economy make their decisions 
about how much to buy and sell, respectively, according to the prices they face. In a mar-
ket economy, resources will therefore be allocated between alternative uses according to 
 relative prices. If the price of one good rises relative to the price of another, consumers 
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 figure 6.9  Lerner Symmetry Th eorem and the  PPF. 
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will buy less of the former and more of the latter. As consumers shift  their purchases, 
producers will produce more of the one good to meet that rising demand and less of the 
other facing declining demand. Hand in hand, as spending patterns change and pro-
duction patterns change, some of the economy’s resources of land, labor, and capital 
are systematically redirected from one use to another. Any given set of  relative prices is 
therefore associated with some  particular allocation of society’s resources among their 
alternative uses. 
 In equation (6.1) we noted that an  ad valorem tariff  of  t on importables will cause the 
domestic and world market prices to diff er by the full extent of the tariff . If we let PI
d  and 
PI
w stand for the domestic and world prices of importables, respectively, we can re-write 
this relationship as follows:
P P tP PI
d
I
w
I
w
I
w+ = ( )t .
 In the absence of any taxes or subsidies on exports, the domestic price and world price of 
exportables would be the same. If PE represents that common price, the  relative price of 
importables in the tariff -imposing country’s home market would be
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 But suppose, instead, the country were to impose an  ad valorem export tax of  t , instead 
of a tariff  on imports. In equation (6.2) we observed that the domestic price of export-
ables would ultimately diff er by the full extent of the tax. If we let PE
d  and PE
w be the 
domestic and world prices of exportables, respectively, we can rewrite this relationship 
as follows:
 P tP PE
d
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d
E
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 Because there is no tariff  on imports, the domestic price and world price of importables 
would be the same, so if PI represents that common price, the  relative price of exportables 
in the country’s home market would be
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 Th is same expression can be written more usefully if we simply take the reciprocal of 
each side and rewrite it this way:
P
P
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⎞
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 (6.5) 
 Notice that equation (6.5) and equation (6.4) are exactly the same! 
 Th is is the Lerner Symmetry Th eorem: If we take a long-run, economy-wide per-
spective, we will eventually see that an  ad valorem tariff  on importables at the rate  t
will have exactly the same eff ect on the relative prices of importables and exporta-
bles as will an  ad valorem export tax at the same rate. Since relative prices govern 
production, consumption, and the overall allocation of resources in the economy, 
the implications of this theorem are clear: an import tariff  and an export tax will 
have exactly the same eff ects on the overall allocation of resources within the country 
adopting them. 
 Anti-export Eff ects of Tariff  Protection 
 Th e Lerner Symmetry Th eorem encourages policymakers to think broadly about the 
economy-wide implications of their actions, and it raises awareness of some unintended 
consequences of actions they might take. 
 For example, suppose the PPF in  Figure  6. 9 is that of a country planning to pursue 
an export-led program of growth and development. If, at the same time, it protects 
its domestic producers of importables with an import tariff , it will clearly be working 
against its own plan. Th e import tariff , raising the domestic relative price of importables, 
and so encouraging resources to fl ow into greater production of importables, must also, 
at the same time, lower the domestic relative price of exportables, causing resources to 
be drawn away from that sector, and output to fall. Th ese anti-export eff ects of tariff  pro-
tection must be taken into consideration in any full assessment of the consequences of 
tariff  protection. 
 VI.  Tariff Preferences for Developing 
Countries 
 Developing countries have long sought access to developed-country markets on prefer-
ential terms, and WTO rules accept the principle of enhanced market access—so called 
“special and diff erential treatment” for developing country exports—as an important 
tool of growth and development. In 2001, the European Union, in its “Anything But 
Arms” initiative, amended its Generalized Scheme of Preferences to grant duty free and 
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quota free access into EU markets of  all products, except arms and ammunition, origi-
nating in 48 less-developed countries. 
 To illustrate the impact such policies have on developing and developed countries, 
consider  Figure  6. 10 , depicting market demand and market supply in a developing 
country’s domestic market for one of its exportable goods. In the absence of any special 
access, this country’s exports will be sold at the world price,  P  w  . Domestic consumption 
will be at B, production at C and the volume of exports will be BC. 
 Let us suppose that some developed country initially maintains a non- discriminatory 
 ad valorem  tariff  at the rate  t on trade with the rest of the world, and that, therefore, 
the prevailing domestic price of this good in the developed country’s home market is 
 P  w  + tP  w  . If special, tariff -free access to this country’s protected home market is now 
granted to the developing country depicted in  Figure  6. 10 , exporters there, now able 
to earn a higher price on sales in the developed country, will redirect sales away from 
the world market, and away from the domestic market, toward that developed coun-
try. As a result, the domestic price of the exportable good in the developing country 
will rise to the level of market price in the protected, developed country’s market, 
 P  w  + tP  w  . As price rises in the developing country, domestic consumption declines 
from B to A, domestic production increases from C to D, and exports expand from 
BC to AD. 
 Th e allocative eff ects in the developing country of enhanced access for their exports 
to protected developed country markets are exactly the same as those resulting from an 
export subsidy. Th e distributional eff ects—both gross and net—are diff erent however. 
 With preferential access, producers of the developing country’s exportable are made 
better off : their producer surplus rises by  a + b + c + d + e . Consumers in the developing 
country are made worse off : their consumer surplus falls by  a + b . With an export sub-
sidy, the developing country’s government would have had to make subsidy payments 
 
S 
Price
 Quantity
D
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 Pw + tPw
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f 
 figure 6.10  Tariff  preference to a developing country. 
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of  b + c + d + e + f to have the same allocative eff ects, and we noted before that that 
would mean net losses in overall social welfare for the developing country totaling  b+f . 
But with preferential access, the developing country government makes no such subsidy 
payments. Instead, the whole of  b + c + d + e + f represents a transfer from consumers 
in the developed country to producers in the developing country. Th is more than com-
pensates for the consumption-side ineffi  ciency,  b , and the production side ineffi  ciency, 
 f , giving a net welfare gain in the developing country of  c + d + e . 
 Notice, though, that the net welfare gain in the developing country— c + d + e —is 
smaller than the transfer from developed country consumers— b + c + d + e + f . Th is 
suggests that direct aid, say in the form of a transfer payment from the developed coun-
try government in the amount  c + d + e , could provide the same net increase in devel-
oping country welfare at lower cost to the developed country, and without introducing 
the production-side and consumption-side ineffi  ciencies that attend the practice of 
enhanced access. Of course, broader policy issues oft en arise in the debate on “trade vs. 
aid,” and while these are outside the scope of the present chapter, they will be taken up in 
more detail in others. 
 VII.  Production Subsidies 
 We’ve seen that tariff s, quotas, export taxes, and export subsidies will always redistribute 
welfare among producers, consumers, and the government, and will in most cases also 
give rise to a net dead-weight loss in social welfare, at least in the small country. But tar-
iff s help spur increased domestic production of import substitutes, and that may form 
part of an overall development plan. Export subsidies encourage increased production 
of exportables, and that, too, may be part of an overall development plan. However, sub-
sidies to production, rather than taxes or subsidies to trade, will generally be able to 
achieve the intended objective at lower social cost. 
 To see why, consider fi rst the left -hand panel of  Figure  6. 11 , and suppose that the 
objective of policy is to increase domestic production of this importable good from A to 
B. One way of doing so would be to implement a tariff  suffi  cient to cause the domestic 
price of the good to rise to  P  d  . As we’ve seen, such a policy would redistribute welfare 
away from consumers toward producers and the government, but it would also result 
in an overall deadweight loss in social welfare equal to the sum of areas  b and  d , due, 
respectively, to the production-side and consumption-side ineffi  ciencies the tariff 
introduces. 
 But suppose, instead, the government were to off er a direct per unit subsidy to domes-
tic producers of this good suffi  cient to shift  the market supply curve out (or down) to 
 S  s  . At the world price  P  w  , plus a per unit subsidy, domestic producers would fi nd it in 
their interest to increase production from A to B. Th at additional production absorbs 
additional domestic resources worth an amount equal to the area beneath the original 
market supply curve between A and B. Because those same AB units could have been 
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purchased from abroad in exchange for domestic resources totaling only the area of the 
rectangle with base AB and height  P  w  , there is still a production-side welfare loss equal 
to area  b . But the policy of subsidizing production has no eff ect on the price consum-
ers pay—they continue to pay the world price  P  w  , and consumption remains at D. As 
a result, there is no consumption-side loss. Assuming that the subsidy is fi nanced by a 
non-distorting lump-sum tax on consumers (or anyone else), the overall eff ect of the 
subsidy policy is to achieve the same production objective as the tariff , but without the 
consumption-side cost. 
 A similar analysis applies in comparing export subsidies with subsidies to the pro-
duction of exportables, regardless of whether they are sold at home or abroad. In the 
right-hand panel of  Figure  6. 11 , the world price of some exportable good is  P  w  , domestic 
production is at C, domestic consumption at B, and exports are BC. If the government 
wanted to encourage production of this exportable good, it could implement an export 
subsidy that would have the eff ect of causing the domestic price to rise to  P  d  . We’ve seen 
that such a policy redistributes welfare from consumers and the government toward 
producers, but results in a net loss in social welfare equal to the sum of areas  b and  f , due, 
again, to the consumption-side and production-side ineffi  ciencies, respectively, that 
this type of policy introduces. 
 But suppose, instead, the government were to off er a direct per unit subsidy to domes-
tic producers, regardless of whether they sold in the domestic market or abroad. If the 
subsidy were suffi  cient to shift  the market supply curve out (or down) to  S  s  , then at the 
prevailing world price  P  w  , plus a per unit subsidy, domestic producers would fi nd it in 
their interest to increase production from C to D. Th at additional production absorbs 
additional domestic resources worth an amount equal to the area beneath the original 
market supply curve between C and D. Domestic producers sell those CD units abroad at 
 P  w  , earning revenues equal only to the area of the rectangle with base CD and height  P  w  , 
so there is still a production-side welfare loss equal to area  f . But the policy of subsidiz-
ing production again has no eff ect on the price consumers pay—they continue to pay the 
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 figure 6.11  Th e Bhagwati–Ramaswami Rule. 
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world price  P  w  , and consumption remains at B. As a result, there is no consumption-side 
loss. Again assuming that the subsidy is fi nanced by a non-distorting lump-sum tax on 
consumers (or anyone else), the overall eff ect of the subsidy policy is to achieve the same 
production objective as the export subsidy, but without the consumption-side cost. 
 Th e principle behind the argument we’ve given here is quite a general one, with 
applicability to many other situations that arise in trade policy. As a very general rule, 
whenever trade policy of some kind can be used to achieve some production-level or 
consumption-level objective, there will always be an alternative policy taxing or subsi-
dizing production or consumption directly that will achieve the desired goal at a smaller 
welfare cost. Th is is known as the Bhagwati–Ramaswami Rule, and the intuition for it 
is fairly simple. Trade—whether imports or exports—is always the diff erence between 
domestic production and domestic consumption of a good. When trade policy is used 
to infl uence domestic production (consumption) it will unavoidably also aff ect domes-
tic consumption (production) of the same good. But subsidies or taxes, on either pro-
duction or consumption, aff ect only the activity at which they are directed, without 
aff ecting the other. As a result, production-side objectives can be achieved without the 
consumption-side costs, and consumption-side objectives can be achieved without the 
production-side costs that always accompany the use of trade policy. 
 VIII.  Other Non-Tariff Barriers 
 Policymakers always feel pressure from powerful interests opposed to freer trade. If 
those seeking protection can organize and exert political pressure more eff ectively than 
those who stand to lose from protection, government may fi nd that pressure hard to 
resist. Yet today countries are increasingly bound together in a world trading system 
that has offi  cially embraced the principle of freer trade. Th rough the GATT, and the 
WTO, countries have committed themselves to a variety of tariff  rationalization and 
reduction programs. Policymakers caught between the international drive toward freer 
trade and the pressure for protection have found creative ways to have their cake and eat 
it too: ways they can avoid direct abrogation of their international obligations, while at 
the same time yielding in some degree to domestic interests seeking protection. 
 Th e UNCTAD system for tracking trade control measures includes 316 diff erent types 
in all, only 32 of which are directly tariff -related measures. Th e rest—fully 91 per cent of 
all types of trade barriers that have been offi  cially identifi ed, categorized, and tracked—
are non-tariff  barriers to trade or NTBs. Import (and export) quotas are important 
NTBs, of course, but there are many others, and they take many diff erent forms. Some 
are nominally related to national defense; some to protecting wildlife; some aim to curb 
drug abuse; some to ensure minimum local content; and the list goes on.  Table 6.2 pro-
vides a broad overview, by diff erent country groups, of the extent to which the princi-
pal (core) NTBs are used across tariff  lines. While there is considerable variation in the 
proportion of tariff  lines subject to NTBs, both across and within the broad country 
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groupings, it is clear from the data that NTBs aff ect a great deal of international trade. 
Here, we will look at just two of the most important types of NTBs. 1 
 Anti-Dumping Actions 
 Under WTO rules, a fi rm can be accused of dumping if it charges a lower price in its 
export market than it does in its home market for the same good. In competitive world 
markets, fi rms have no power to unilaterally set price: market demand and market sup-
ply do that. Dumping is therefore something that can only occur “naturally” in markets 
that are dominated by relatively few fi rms with enough market power to set their own 
prices. In addition, the fi rms must be able to separate their home and export markets, 
otherwise resale of the product from the low-price to the high-price market would make 
it impossible for the fi rm to charge diff erent prices. 
 When dumping occurs it is generally regarded as “unfair trade” (though many 
economists do not see it this way). WTO rules allow countries that can demon-
strate “material injury” to their domestic producers caused by dumping from for-
eign firms to take anti-dumping actions in response. These will typically involve 
authorization for a departure from general non-discrimination rules allowing the 
injured party to impose additional or anti-dumping duties on imports of the good 
 1  During the 1970s and 1980s, some countries negotiated Voluntary Export Restraint (VER) and 
Voluntary Import Expansion (VIE) agreements with major trading partners. “Results-based” NTBs like 
these, at odds with longstanding principles of the GATT and the WTO aimed at building a “rules-based” 
world trading system, are no longer commonly used. 
 Table 6.2  Percentage of tariff lines subject to core NTBs. 
 Average Percentage 
with greater 
than 15% 
coverage Country group  Years  Simple  Weighted Std. dev. max.
 High-income Non-OECD (7)  1994–2001  17.7  18.2  13.7  43.5  57.1 
 High-income OECD (9)  1996–2001  29.0  29.5  8.1  36.9  88.9 
 Developing countries (65)  1992–2001  15.7  18.9  16.9  69.7  38.5 
 Low income (20)  1993–2001  6.2  10.0  8.9  40.2  5.0 
 Middle income (45)  1992–2001  20.0  22.9  17.9  69.7  53.3 
 Source: Ng, F. K. T., “Frequency Coverage Ratio of Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) by Country,” World Bank 
Trade Research. 
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from the specific country whose firm is deemed guilty of dumping. These duties, 
though, are generally not to exceed the minimum necessary to offset the damage 
done by the dumping. 
 It is relatively easy to initiate anti-dumping actions, so they are often the policy of 
choice for protectionist influences.  Table 6.3 gives some idea of the frequency with 
which such actions have been taken by WTO members over the period 1995–2008. 
The US initiated quite a few anti-dumping actions against other industrialized 
countries over this period, but both the US and the EU initiated many more against 
developing countries than they did against each other. Developing countries, too, 
have initiated a large number of anti-dumping actions against other developing 
countries over the same period. India has initiated by far the most anti-dumping 
 Table 6.3  The anti-dumping Top 20, 1995–2008. 
 Top 20 initiators  Top 20 Targets 
 Country  Number  Country  Number 
 India  564  China  677 
 United States  418  Korea  252 
 European Union  391  United States  189 
 Argentina  241  Taiwan  187 
 South Africa  206  Indonesia  145 
 Australia  197  Japan  144 
 Brazil  170  Thailand  142 
 China  151  India  137 
 Canada  145  Russia  109 
 Turkey  137  Brazil    97 
 Korea  108  Malaysia   90 
 Mexico   95  Germany   83 
 Indonesia   73  European Union   69 
 Egypt   65  Ukraine   61 
 Peru   64  South Africa   58 
 New Zealand   53  Italy   46 
 Colombia   43  Singapore   44 
 Malaysia   43  Spain   44 
 Thailand   39  Turkey   44 
 Israel   32  UK   44 
 Source: WTO data compiled by antidumpingpublishing.com 
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actions of any nation, and China has been the most frequent target by a very large 
margin. 
 Economists are of many minds on the issue of dumping. If the dumping is preda-
tory in nature—intended by the foreign fi rm to drive domestic fi rms out of business so 
that the foreign fi rm would then be free to exercise greater monopoly power—dump-
ing would be something to oppose. If, however, a foreign fi rm sells at a high price in 
its home market and a lower price in its export market because competitive or other 
market conditions in the export market require it to do so, there seems no good reason 
to oppose it. 
 SPS Measures 
 Economist Robert Baldwin has likened the long post-war process of multilateral 
negotiations under the GATT and WTO, and the success they’ve had in reduc-
ing traditional forms of trade restrictions such as tariffs, quotas, and subsidies, as 
something akin to draining a swamp. As the water level has been made to steadily 
recede, it has revealed all the, “snags and stumps of non-tariff barriers that still have 
to be cleared away” ( Baldwin,  2000 ). Many of the most gnarly stumps and nettle-
some snags are now found in the different ways that countries regulate sanitation 
and protect the health of their plant and animal life. Is a regulation that imported 
wine be “cooked” to a certain temperature before being admitted into the USA a 
legitimate means of safeguarding California agriculture from French parasites, or 
is it a way of reducing the complexity, and so the allure, of the French product so 
that fewer buyers will want to buy it? Is a ban on the importation of poultry from 
countries not free of Newcastle disease a legitimate means of protecting the health 
of poultry and the public in Britain—the only country free of the disease—or is 
it an unfair means of protecting British poultry farmers from competition on the 
European continent? 
 Where public health and safety of the food supply are involved, a country’s vital inter-
ests can truly be at stake. However, the potential for anti-competitive mischief in the 
abuse of a country’s sovereign right to establish its own Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary 
Measures (SPS) measures is also obvious. Recent trade disputes between the EU and US 
over genetically modifi ed food products have been among the most highly publicized 
examples of the diffi  culties, and the mutual suspicion, cross-country diff erences of this 
sort can create. But it is also a very real problem for developing countries. Agricultural 
exports from developing countries, where enforcement of domestic SPS measures may 
not yet be uniform and fully up to international standards, can be an easy target for agri-
cultural interests in the importing countries around which to rally public and political 
support for protection. 
 Recognizing the legitimate demands of both importing and exporting countries, 
and the potential for abuse, member countries in the WTO have worked to harmonize 
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cross-country SPS measures, to make them more transparent and to forge agreement 
on what shall constitute “good science” in determining the legitimacy of new or exist-
ing regulations in this area. Developed countries have been subject to the provisions of 
the SPS Agreement since 1995, developing countries since 1997, and least-developed 
countries since 2000. Th is remains, however, an important area of ongoing discussion 
and negotiation. 
 IX.  Summary 
 We have examined the principal instruments of trade policy, paying special attention 
to the impact each has on resource allocation and the distribution of welfare. Much of 
what has been discussed is summarized in  Table 6.4 . 
 Some broad patterns emerge from our analysis. In the case of a small trading coun-
try, restrictions on trade will tend to favor some at the expense of others but, as a 
general rule, result in a net dead-weight loss in national welfare as each introduces 
production-side and consumption-side ineffi  ciencies compared to free trade. Th is 
suggests strongly that when distributional goals are the ultimate objectives of policy, 
using trade policy instruments in pursuit of those objectives is ineffi  cient. More direct 
means of redistribution that do not distort market prices from their free trade levels, 
and so do not lead to the associated production-side and consumption-side ineffi  -
ciencies, should be able to achieve those same objectives at lower social cost. When 
the objective of policy is not redistribution, but instead to encourage production, 
trade policy will again be an ineffi  cient means of achieving the objective since it aff ects 
both consumption and production at once. In such cases, subsidies to production 
will achieve the same production goal with no consumption-side eff ect, and so lower 
social cost. 
 Th ere are, however, some qualifi cations. For the most part, we have assumed com-
petitive world markets on which the trading country has no appreciable market 
power. One important exception we considered is the optimal tariff  in the case of a 
large country: by exploiting its market power on the world market, a large trading 
country may be able to turn its terms of trade in its favor suffi  ciently to ensure an over-
all national welfare gain. Th is comes at the expense of its trading partners, however, 
and so is likely to provoke retaliation. Ensuing tariff  wars will generally be welfare 
reducing for all. 
 Th ere are other qualifi cations and extensions to our analysis that arise when home 
country and world markets are imperfectly competitive. In such cases, opportuni-
ties for strategic behavior by fi rms, and by governments, can qualify and even reverse 
some of our conclusions about the eff ects of certain policy instruments. A careful 
analysis of these exceptions is beyond the scope of this chapter, but will be taken up 
in others. 
06_Zanini_Ch06.indd   175 6/13/2013   1:13:44 PM
    Ta
bl
e 
6.
4   
 Im
pa
ct
 o
f 
tr
ad
e 
po
lic
y 
on
 r
es
ou
rc
e 
al
lo
ca
tio
n 
an
d 
w
el
fa
re
.   
  Re
so
ur
ce
 A
llo
ca
tio
n  
  Di
st
rib
ut
io
n  
  Co
ns
um
er
  
  Pr
od
uc
er
  
  Go
ve
rn
m
en
t  
  N
et
  
  Ta
rg
et
  
  In
st
ru
m
en
t  
     
  Co
ns
um
pt
io
n  
  Pr
od
uc
tio
n  
     
  w
el
fa
re
  
  w
el
fa
re
  
  re
ve
nu
e  
  w
el
fa
re
  
     
  Im
po
rt
s  
 Ta
rif
f 
 Sm
al
l c
ou
nt
ry
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
 La
rg
e 
co
un
tr
y 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
 (a
) 
 Qu
ot
a 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
  ?  
   
 
 (b
) 
 VE
R 
(im
po
rt
in
g 
co
un
tr
y)
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
  N
on
e  
   
 
 (c
) 
 An
ti-
du
m
pi
ng
 d
ut
ie
s 
 Sa
m
e 
as
 ta
rif
f 
  Ex
po
rt
s  
 Ex
po
rt
 ta
x 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
 Ex
po
rt
 s
ub
si
dy
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
 Ta
rif
f p
re
fe
re
nc
es
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
  N
on
e  
   
 
 (d
) 
 VI
E 
(im
po
rt
in
g 
co
un
tr
y)
 
   
 
   
 
   
    
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
 (e
) 
  Pr
od
uc
tio
n  
 Pr
od
uc
tio
n 
su
bs
id
ie
s 
 Im
po
rt
ab
le
s 
  N
on
e  
   
 
  N
on
e  
   
 
   
 
   
 
 (f)
 
 Ex
po
rt
ab
le
s 
  N
on
e  
   
 
  N
on
e  
   
 
   
 
   
 
 (g
) 
   N
ot
es
 —
  
  (a
) T
ra
ns
fe
r f
ro
m
 fo
re
ig
n 
pr
od
uc
er
s 
to
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t. 
M
ay
 p
ro
vo
ke
 re
ta
lia
tio
n,
 w
ith
 w
el
fa
re
 lo
ss
.  
  (b
) G
ov
er
nm
en
t r
ev
en
ue
 d
ep
en
ds
 o
n 
m
et
ho
d 
fo
r a
llo
ca
tin
g 
lic
en
se
s.  
  (c
) T
ra
ns
fe
r f
ro
m
 im
po
rt
in
g 
co
un
tr
y 
co
ns
um
er
s 
to
 e
xp
or
tin
g 
co
un
tr
y 
pr
od
uc
er
s.  
  (d
) T
ra
ns
fe
r f
ro
m
 im
po
rt
in
g 
co
un
tr
y 
co
ns
um
er
s 
to
 e
xp
or
tin
g 
co
un
tr
y 
pr
od
uc
er
s.  
  (e
) T
ra
ns
fe
r f
ro
m
 im
po
rt
in
g 
co
un
tr
y 
pr
od
uc
er
s 
an
d 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t t
o 
ex
po
rt
in
g 
co
un
tr
y 
pr
od
uc
er
s.  
  (f)
 S
m
al
le
r w
el
fa
re
 lo
ss
 th
an
 ta
rif
f w
ith
 e
qu
iv
al
en
t p
ro
te
ct
iv
e 
ef
fe
ct
.  
  (g
) S
m
al
le
r w
el
fa
re
 lo
ss
 th
an
 e
xp
or
t s
ub
si
dy
 w
ith
 e
qu
iv
al
en
t e
ff
ec
t o
n 
pr
od
uc
tio
n.
  
06_Zanini_Ch06.indd   176 6/13/2013   1:13:44 PM
instruments of trade policy   177
 
Price
 Quantity
D
1 2 3 4 
P1
P2
P3
P4
a b c d 
 figure 6.a1  Area under the demand curve measures willingness to  pay. 
 Appendix  
 Consumer and Producer Surplus 
 To weigh costs and benefi ts from alternative policies, economists require some sort of dollar-
denominated measure that can be aggregated and compared across individuals aff ected by 
those policies. Two commonly used measures of this sort are consumer surplus and producer 
surplus. 
 Consumer Surplus 
 By consumer surplus we mean the excess value a consumer attaches to having a unit of a good 
over and above what she has to pay for it. Consumer surplus thus measures, in dollars, the net 
welfare gain a consumer realizes from buying a unit of the good. 
 Figure  6. A1 depicts an ordinary market demand curve for some good. Typically, we would 
read the demand curve “over and down,” asking, “at such and such price, how many units of 
the good will consumers want to buy?” We could, instead, though, read it “up and over,” asking, 
“what is the maximum price some consumer would be willing to pay for some particular unit 
of the good?” If we ask the consumers depicted in  Figure  6. A1 that question about the fi rst unit, 
someone would answer, “ P  1  .” Th en  P  1  , and so, also, the area of the rectangle with base 1 unit 
in width and height  P  1  , measures some consumer’s maximum willingness to pay for the very 
fi rst unit of this good consumed. Th is maximum willingness to pay is the total value that the 
consumer attaches to having one unit of the good. 
 With one unit being consumed, we could ask consumers how much one of them would be 
willing to pay to have another. According to the demand curve,  P  2  , and so again also the area of 
the rectangle with base 1 unit and height  P  2  , would measure some (perhaps other) consumer’s 
willingness to pay for that second unit. We could ask it again of our consumers for the third 
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unit, and the fourth unit in turn. Each time, the rectangle with base 1 unit and height fi rst  P  3  , 
then  P  4  , would measure some consumer’s maximum willingness to pay for successive units of 
the good. But then an amount of money equal to the  sum of the areas of those rectangles, or 
 a + b + c + d , must measure the willingness of some  group of consumers to pay for a  total of four 
units of this good. 
 If we were now to simply change the scale of measurement along the horizontal axis, making 
the distance between successive units of the good smaller and smaller, before too long the area 
of the rectangles  a + b + c + d in  Figure  6. A1 would become indistinguishable from the whole 
area beneath the market demand curve, up to four units. By this same reasoning, and with 
appropriately chosen scales, we may therefore regard the entire area underneath a market 
demand curve, up to any number of units, Q, as a measure of the total willingness to pay for a 
total of Q units by consumers as a group. As a result, economists oft en regard the area under a 
demand curve as a measure of the total value consumers as a group attach to having a total of 
 Q units to consume. 
 But consumers must usually pay something for what they get to consume. Suppose our 
consumers are allowed to buy  Q  1  units at a fi xed price,  P , per unit. Th eir total outlay is  P*Q  1  , or 
the area of the rectangle marked  b  1  in  Figure  6. A2 . Getting something worth  a  1  +b  1  in exchange 
for payments of  b  1  , leaves consumers as a group better off , net, by the amount of area  a  1  . Th is is 
consumer surplus on this transaction and, as you see, it always measures, in dollar-terms, the 
 net gain that consumers as a group realize from the transaction concerned. 
 If consumers were free to buy as much or as little of this good as they chose, the demand 
curve tells us they would want to buy a total of  Q  2   units—the point on the market demand 
curve at price,  P . Notice that the additional  Q  2  − Q  1  units cost consumers an additional 
outplay equal to area  b  2  , but those units have a value to those consumers totaling  a  2  + b  2  , so 
consumers as a group enjoy an additional, or incremental consumer surplus on those new 
units equal to  a  2  . 
 
Price
 Quantity
D
Q1
P 
a1
b1
a2
b2
Q2
 figure 6.a2  Consumer surplus measures consumers’ net gain. 
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 Producer Surplus 
 On the other side of any market transaction, fi rms provide goods to consumers in exchange 
for money payment. By producer surplus we mean any amount a fi rm earns in that transaction 
over and above the minimum that would have been necessary to make it just willing to agree 
to the transaction. Producer surplus thus measures, in dollars, the net welfare gain a producer 
realizes from a transaction. 
 Producer surplus can be seen on familiar graphs too. In  Figure  6. A3 , the market supply curve 
of a large number of perfectly competitive fi rms is depicted and, normally, we would read that 
supply curve “over and down,” asking how many units all fi rms together would off er for sale at 
some fi xed price per unit. We could, though, read it “up and over,” instead, asking, for any given 
unit of the good, what is the minimum payment some fi rm would be willing to accept to provide 
it. If we ask that question of the fi rms depicted in  Figure  6. A3 about the fi rst unit, one of them 
would answer, “ P  1  .” Th en  P  1  , and so also the area of the rectangle with base 1 unit and height 
 P  1  , measures the minimum payment some fi rm would require in order to be willing to provide 
that fi rst unit. By a process now familiar, we could ask, in turn, the minimum some fi rm would 
require in order to provide the second, then the third, then the fourth units. Stepping back, and 
asking instead the minimum payment our group of fi rms as a whole would require in order just 
to be willing to provide a total of four units for sale, we know what the answer would be: the 
whole of the area  a + b + c + d . If, again, we were to simply change the scale of measurement 
along the horizontal axis, making the distance between successive units of the good smaller 
and smaller, before long the area of the rectangles  a + b + c + d would become indistinguishable 
from the area underneath the fi rm’s supply curve, up to four units. By this same reasoning, and 
with appropriately chosen scales, we may therefore regard the entire area underneath a market 
supply curve up to any number,  Q , units of the good as measuring the minimum total payment 
fi rms as a group would require in order to be just willing to supply  Q  units. 
 In  Figure  6. A4 , then, the minimum fi rms as a group would require in order to provide  Q  1  
units is measured by the area  b  1  . But what would any fi rm consider in determining the minimum 
payment it needed in order to provide one or more of those  Q  1  units? Surely, such a payment 
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3 4 
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 figure 6.a3  Area under the supply curve measures resource  cost. 
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would need to cover the cost of any labor, capital, or other resources the fi rm must acquire to 
produce the output it provides. Th at area  b  1  , therefore, must also measure the total cost of all 
resources that all fi rms, and so society, must devote to producing those  Q 1  units. 
 Now suppose that fi rms are able to sell  Q  1  units at a price of  P per unit. Th e total revenue 
earned by fi rms would be  P*Q 1 or area  a  1  +b  1  in  Figure  6. A4 . Receiving payment of  a  1  +b  1  in 
exchange for something the fi rm would be just willing to sell for  b  1  leaves the fi rm better off , net, 
by the amount of area  a  1  . Th is is producer surplus on this transaction and, as you see, it always 
measures, in dollars, the  net gain that fi rms as a group realize from the transaction concerned. 
 If fi rms were free to sell as much or as little as they chose, the supply curve tells us they would 
want to sell a total of  Q  2  units—the point on the market supply curve at price,  P . Notice that 
fi rms would be willing to supply the additional  Q  2   − Q  1  units for an additional payment equal 
to area  b  2  , the cost of the additional resources needed to produce that increment in output. But 
fi rms receive an additional payment totaling a2 + b  2  , so they enjoy an additional, or incremental 
producer surplus on those new units equal to  a  2  . 
 Social Welfare 
 With separate measures of consumer welfare and producer welfare in hand, we could form a 
simple measure of overall  social welfare arising from transactions in a single market by taking 
the sum of consumer and producer surplus: 
 SW = CS + PS . (6.A.1) 
 Figure  6. A5 illustrates. Suppose that for some reason—perhaps due to government rules 
and regulations restricting buyers’ and sellers’ behavior—only  Q  1   units of a good are bought 
and sold in some market at a price of  P per unit. From those transactions, consumers enjoy 
 Q  1  units of the good, worth a total of  a  1  + b  1  + c  1  to them. Th ey must pay producers  b  1  + c  1  , 
giving consumer surplus of  a  1  . Producers receive revenues of  b  1  + c  1  for the  Q  1  units on which 
they must expend resources worth  c  1  to produce, giving producer surplus of  b  1  . Notice that 
the sum of consumer and producer surplus—the whole of area  a  1  + b  1  —measures the total of 
net benefi ts received by many diff erent individuals in society—some of them consumers and 
some of them producers—as a result of the transactions described. We may regard that sum as 
the total of net gains to someone in society from the underlying activities of producing, selling, 
and consuming those  Q  1  units of the good, over and above the value of society’s resources 
that were expended in the process. Th e division of this sum between consumer surplus and 
producer surplus is easy to see in the fi gure, and so it is easy for us to see how these net gains are 
distributed between consumers and producers of this good in society. 
 We can use these methods to compare diff erent market outcomes from an overall social 
point of view: one market outcome can be judged better than another from the viewpoint of 
society as a whole if the  sum of net benefi ts to consumers and producers—the sum of consumer 
and producer surplus—is larger in the one market outcome than it is in the other. 
 In  Figure  6. A5 suppose that new government policies cause the number of units produced 
and consumed to rise to  Q  2  , while market price remains at  P . Consumer surplus on those  Q  2  
units at that price totals  a 1 + a  2  . Producer surplus totals  b  1  + b  2  . Th e sum of consumer and 
producer surplus is now  a  1  + a  2  + b  1  + b  2  . Since this is larger than it was when only  Q  1  units 
were produced and consumed, the total of all net gains to consumers and producers throughout 
society is now higher than it was before. In that sense, the market outcome providing  Q  2  units 
can be judged better for society as a whole than the one providing only  Q  1  As a general rule, 
the very same principles enable us to judge any market outcome as better than any other from 
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a social point of view if the sum of consumer and producer surplus is higher in the one than it 
is in the other. 
 Th e careful, and skeptical, reader will have noticed that when the social value of market 
outcomes is compared in this way, we treat a dollar’s net welfare gain to any one person in 
society—any consumer or any producer—has having the same signifi cance to society as a dollar’s 
net welfare gain to any other person in society—whether consumer or producer. Similarly, we 
treat a dollar’s net welfare  loss to some person as representing no loss in the welfare of society 
as long as some other person—anyone else—enjoys a dollar’s net welfare gain at the same time. 
 Th e sum of consumer and producer surplus, used as an index of social welfare, does, in fact, 
bring decidedly utilitarian moral values to the exercise: individuals are treated in a completely 
symmetric way, with no favorites, and the welfare of society as a whole is being reckoned by the 
simple sum of net benefi ts to all its members. For some economists, and some policymakers, 
this is the view they take and defend: individuals either should, as a moral proposition, or must, 
as a practical one, be treated equally in this manner when making public policy. Others will 
not be comfortable with this point of view, taking, instead, the position that the distribution 
between advantaged and disadvantaged individuals within society is, and ought to be, an 
important concern of those making policy. Even if one takes this position, though, the sum of 
consumer and producer surplus still provides an important and useful guide to selecting among 
diff erent policies that impinge on markets. 
 To see why, look again at  Figure  6. A 5 . Th e policy that implements output level  Q  1  gives total 
surplus of  a  1  + b  1  . Th e policy implementing output level  Q  2  gives total surplus greater than that 
by  a  2  + b  2  . Since the size of the overall social welfare “pie” is bigger in the second case than it is in 
the fi rst, it must be possible when the second policy is implemented to ensure that everyone has 
a slice of that larger pie that is no smaller than the one they would have had under the fi rst policy, 
and still there will be pie left  over to divide among people in any way desired. Economists call 
such a change as we’re describing—one where no one is made any worse off  and at least some 
are made better off —a  Pareto improvement in welfare. Whenever the sum of consumer and 
producer surplus is increased, there is always the potential for a Pareto improvement in welfare. 
Of course, turning the potential for Pareto improvement into an actual Pareto improvement 
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 figure 6.a4  Producer surplus measures producers’ net gain. 
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will oft en require some form of redistribution—say though lump-sum taxes or subsidies—to 
also be part of the policy package. 
 But what if the sum of consumer and producer surplus is as large as it can possibly be? In  Figure 
 6. A5 , when output is at  Q  *  the sum of producer and consumer surplus will be maximized—
equal in amount to the entire area between market demand and market supply to the left  of 
 Q  *  . If the welfare “pie” is as big as it can possibly be, there will be no way to give any one person 
a larger slice without, at the same time, giving someone else a smaller slice. Further Pareto 
improvements in welfare will be impossible. Economists call such situations  Pareto effi  cient . 
 Notice that output level  Q  *  in  Figure A5 is the equilibrium level of output we would expect 
to arise from unhindered market trading between buyers and sellers—the  laissez-faire market 
outcome—if this were a properly functioning competitive market. (We’ve not drawn in the 
equilibrium market price that would prevail because that is not important at the moment.) It is 
no coincidence that the equilibrium level of output in a competitive market is Pareto effi  cient. 
In fact, economists call that very important property of competitive markets Th e First Welfare 
Th eorem of competitive economics! 
 Th e First Welfare Th eorem helps you understand why economists are oft en reluctant to 
recommend any kind of policy that interferes with properly functioning competitive markets. 
If such market equilibria maximize the sum of consumer and producer surplus, and so are 
Pareto effi  cient, then  any policy intervention that changes the market outcome in  any way can 
only, at best, redistribute welfare toward some and away from others: and, more oft en than not, 
it will also cause the overall level of welfare—the size of the social welfare “pie”—to shrink. 
When that happens, no matter what the policymaker’s distributional objectives might be, the 
economist would argue that they can be better met—with lower net welfare cost to society—by 
leaving the market equilibrium alone and addressing those distributional objectives directly, 
though an appropriate system of lump-sum taxes and subsidies. 
 For our work in this chapter, it is wise, though, to ask how the arguments and methods 
presented here must be amended if government does involve itself in the market. For example, 
if the government were to introduce a tax causing the price consumers pay to rise, and the 
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 figure 6.a5  Social welfare as the sum of consumer and producer surplus. 
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price producers receive to fall, both consumer and producer surplus would fall. But should 
we necessarily conclude that overall social welfare declined, too? Aft er all, the government 
now collects tax revenue it did not have before, and it will presumably do something with that 
revenue. If we take the view that a dollar of tax revenue collected by government will fi nd its 
way, somehow and somewhere, to benefi t someone in society by a dollar, then all we have to do 
is include those government revenues as an equal part of the overall social calculation. In cases 
where government plays a role, then, we would simply expand the index of social welfare in 
equation (6.A.1) to include any net government revenues collected,  R , as follows: 
 SW = CS + PS + R . 
 Th is is the index of social welfare we use throughout the chapter. 
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